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Abstract 
The term ‘evolution’ is used loosely in the policy literature and its meaning is frequently 
unclear.  This article injects clarity into debates of evolution and establishes its ability to 
describe and explain policy change.  It has four main aims.  First, it identifies the explicit and 
implicit uses of evolutionary theory in policy studies.  Second, it considers how such 
accounts relate to each other and the wider literature on public policy.  Third, it identifies the 
causal mechanisms involved in evolutionary accounts.  Finally, it considers how to translate 




The notion of evolution has intuitive appeal in policy studies, and is used frequently to 
describe policy change.  Its strongest proponents portray ‘evolutionary theory’ as the solution 
to a wide range of unresolved debates on endogenous and exogenous change, the nature of 
institutions, rational choice and norms, and structure and agency (Lewis and Steinmo, 2010).  
However, the meaning of ‘evolution’ is not always clear.  Indeed, part of its appeal may 
relate to its ambiguity and our ability to use it to describe many processes.  In public policy 
this includes: the cumulative, long term development of policy solutions; major disruptions in 
the way that policymakers think about, and try to solve, policy problems; the maintenance or 
radical reform of policymaking institutions; emergent behaviour within complex systems; the 
trial-and-error strategies adopted by actors, such as policy entrepreneurs, when adapting to 
their environment; and, the coming together of multiple factors to create the conditions for 
major policy change.  Further, the latter can suggest a creative process, such as when policy 
entrepreneurs exploit the right conditions to make their move during a ‘window of 
opportunity’, or a destructive process, in which policy failure or crisis seems to undermine 
institutions and force policymakers to change their approach radically.  These descriptions 
are central to the study of public policy and ‘evolution’ is a vital but problematic concept.   
The first problem is that many scholars use the term ‘evolution’ loosely without considering 
its definition or its nature (Kerr, 2002: 330; Lewis and Steinmo, 2008: 22, fn. 46; Lustick, 
2011: 205).  This loose usage reflects widespread confusion about what evolution generally 
means (Sementelli, 2007; see Lustick, 2011: 187 on ‘descent with modification’).  They may 
also present different understandings of ‘evolutionary’ processes in a single account of policy 
change without considering their relationship and compatibility.      Evolution can refer, 
rather confusingly, to slow progress (‘gradual, incremental and cumulative’), in which we 
posit evolution as the counterpoint to revolution, and/ or major disruptive change akin to 
revolution (Hay, 2002: 156-7).  It can refer to maturation and movement towards 
‘advancement’ (associated with Lamarck), or to ‘directionless movement’ in which we make 
no reference to the ‘the idea of progress’ without considering the possibility of regress 
(Sementelli, 2007: 743-5; Steinmo, 2010: 20).  It can refer to natural selection, describing the 
‘blind’ adaptation by species to their environment, artificial selection, describing the ability 
of ‘entrepreneurs’ to learn and innovate as they adapt to their environment, or a process in 
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which actors adapt to and help create their environment (Room, 2012; Kerr, 2002: 336; Kerr, 
2003: 120; Kay, 2003: 108).  It can describe ‘pure mutations’, perhaps equivalent to major 
policy change, or ‘phyletic transformations’, equivalent to incremental change (Durant and 
Diehl, 1989: 195; and mutation can be ‘rapid’ or ‘protracted’ - 1989: 196).  It can be used as 
a metaphor or a description of reality (Curry, 2003: Kay, 2003: 105; Kerr, 2003: 119; 125; 
Lewis and Steinmo, 2008: 33).  Finally, it can refer to the role of individuals and/ or their 
genes, the population as a whole and/ or the role of its environment (note, in political science, 
the ideational equivalent of genes is ‘memes’ – John, 2003: 493; Lewis and Steinmo, 2008: 
4-5; Dawkins, 1976).  This potential for ambiguity is not a problem per se, but it prompts us 
to be explicit regarding our use of ‘evolution’. 
The second problem is that ‘evolution’ comes with baggage based on its use, mostly in the 
past, to compare populations.  For example, there is a strong historical link between ‘social 
Darwinism’ and racist and sexist arguments (Kerr, 2002: 332; Lewis and Steinmo, 2008: 6; 
2010: 238; Steinmo, 2010: 19; Lustick, 2011: 183-4) and a tendency to view some economic 
models as more advanced than others (Steinmo 2010: 20-1).  Most modern, explicit accounts 
of evolution do not adhere to a ‘teleological’ notion of progress towards a predetermined 
social end (Sementelli, 2007:  743; Kerr, 2002: 333; 338; although see Lustick, 2011: 186 on 
progress according to agreed aims).  However, we still need to be particularly clear about 
what we mean by evolution in public policy because the normative stakes are high.  
In this light, the article has four main aims.  First, it identifies key evolutionary theories in 
public policy.  It examines their ideas regarding normative issues (do policies progress 
following evolution?) and their descriptions of time and policy change (are we studying long 
term cumulative advance or rapid and major disruptions?).  Second, it considers how they 
relate to the wider policy literature.  It cautions against treating evolutionary theory as a 
revolutionary break from the past.  Much of its appeal relates to its potential to combine 
established studies of policymaking.  Third, it identifies the causal mechanisms involved in 
evolutionary accounts: variation, selection and retention.  Finally, it considers how to 
translate abstract theory into concrete methods for empirical research.  It cautions against 
selecting some methods and rejecting others ruthlessly, since evolutionary theory provides 
the potential to combine a range of methods in innovative ways. 
Evolutionary Theory in Policy Studies: Multiple Streams Analysis 
Our modern history of ‘evolution’ in policy studies begins with multiple streams analysis 
(although see Lindblom, 1959: 85 on how policy ‘evolves’ through ‘mutual adjustment’).  
According to Kingdon (1984; 1995), the policy process consists of three separate streams – 
problems (agenda setting), policies (ideas or solutions) and politics (receptivity to solutions) 
– and major policy change may only occur when they come together during a brief ‘window 
of opportunity’ (1984: 177).  The problem stream provides the potential for major 
policymaking disruptions and non-incremental change when there are lurches of attention, 
often caused by a combination of novelty (including ‘focusing events’) and latent interest 
(Kingdon, 1984: 103; Cairney, 2012a: 187-8; 234; Cairney et al, 2012: 222; Birkland, 1997; 
Durant and Diehl, 1989).  This shift of attention is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
major change.  Change also requires that a feasible policy solution exists – and solutions 
cannot be produced at short notice. They often develop over years or decades. To deal with 
this disconnect between attention and the time it takes to produce solutions, communities of 
policy specialists develop proposals in anticipation of problems (1984: 122–4).  
Kingdon’s ‘Darwinian’ metaphor describes the time and effort it takes for feasible policy 
solutions to develop; they whirl around in the ‘policy primeval soup’, proposed by one actor 
then ‘softened up’ by many participants to ‘recombine familiar elements’ and change their 
‘technical feasibility’, ‘value acceptability’ or anticipated costs (1984: 138–46; 1995: 226-7).  
‘Evolution’ describes the slow progress of an idea towards acceptability within the policy 
community.  It is complete when policymakers are receptive to the solution and have the 
motive and opportunity to adopt it (Kingdon, 1995: 165–6; Lieberman, 2002).     Policy 
changes, but only when new solutions are made more consistent with existing practices.  The 
role of policy entrepreneurs is important but limited: they are the well-informed and well-
connected insiders who provide the knowledge and tenacity to help bring the ‘streams’ 
together – but as ‘surfers waiting for the big wave’ rather than people who control policy 
processes (1995: 225; 1984: 173; compare with Lustick, 2011: 204 on ‘exaption’ and the 
ability of entrepreneurs to exploit decisions made by other people). 
Durant and Diehl (1989: 201-2) provide two departures.  First, they identify a more rapid 
process, of solution production and acceptance, when there is no disconnect between the 
policy agenda and the production of solutions.  Kingdon’s idea, based on a study of the US 
(although these ideas have been applied elsewhere, including the UK
i
), is that the process is 
separated into three separate streams because different people may be most involved in 
different stages.  For example, the President raises issues and the bureaucracy (or policy 
network) provides the solutions.  Durant and Diehl (1989: 201-2) identify some areas, such as 
foreign policy, in which the President raises issues and has a direct influence on the 
production and adoption of solutions.  Second, they highlight greater potential for ‘pure 
mutation’ rather than ‘phyletic’ – i.e. the adoption of policies (such as the New Deal) which 
represent the policy equivalent of new species rather than humans with shorter fingernails 
(although the distinction is not as clear as their two-by-two picture suggests).  
Punctuated Equilibrium 
Baumgartner and Jones’ (1993; 2009; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; True et al, 2007; 
Workman et al, 2009) punctuated equilibrium theory suggests that this potential for rapid and 
substantive policy change is a general feature of political systems.  Like ‘evolution’, 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ii  is only useful as a concept when well defined – a requirement 
made problematic if the same term is used differently throughout political science. However, 
in policy studies (at least in the US and UK) it is generally taken to refer to long periods of 
apparent political stability and policy continuity punctuated by instability and rapid and 
profound change (Cairney, 2012a: 177; 273).   Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 48) argue that 
incremental change in most cases is accompanied by seismic change in a small number of 
cases – an outcome consistent with ‘power laws’ found in the natural and social worlds 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: xxii).  Both outcomes result from ‘disruptive dynamics’ 
which ‘are a function of how political systems process information’ (2009: 289).  Decision 
makers are boundedly rational (Simon, 1976) and cannot consider all issues at all times, 
producing two related outcomes.  First, issues are subject to parallel and serial processing.  
Most policy is processed by a large number of small and specialist policy subsystems which 
address issues at a level of government not particularly visible to the public, and with 
minimal involvement from senior policymakers.  Only some issues are dealt with at the 
‘macropolitical’ level (True et al, 2007: 158–9).  Second, policymakers ignore most issues 
and promote relatively few to the top of their agenda. This lack of attention to issues helps 
explain why most relationships within subsystems and policies may not change, while intense 
periods of attention to some issues may destabilise relationships and prompt new ways to 
frame policy problems.   
Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 35–7) use similar factors as Kingdon to explain attention shift, 
but also stress the importance of multiple ‘venues’ and the potential for the losers in policy 
disputes in one venue to seek more sympathetic audiences in others.  ‘Policy monopolies’ 
exist in subsystems (networks) when some actors are able to create or maintain institutions 
whose rules reflect a particular policy image – often when (a) the problem appears to have 
been solved and (b) actor involvement is restricted to technical details of implementation 
(1993: 59-82).  They are often challenged when groups pursue new policy images and try to 
encourage greater attention and participation in other venues.   
The success of such challenges is significant in number, but rare as a proportion of 
government activity, because policymakers must ignore most issues.  They also exhibit 
‘selective attention’ – when their existing view of how the world works, and should work, 
limits further the problems to which they pay attention and the solutions they are willing to 
consider.  Change often requires a critical mass of attention and pressure to overcome the 
conservatism of decision makers and to shift their attention from competing problems (Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2005: 19–20; 48–51). If levels of external pressure reach this tipping point, 
they cause major and infrequent punctuations rather than smaller and more regular policy 
changes: the burst in attention and communication becomes self-reinforcing; new approaches 
are considered; different ‘weights’ are applied to the same categories of information; policy is 
driven ideologically by new actors; and/or the ‘new’ issue sparks off new conflicts between 
political actors (2005: 52; 69). Information processing is therefore characterized by ‘stasis 
interrupted by bursts of innovation’ and policy responses are unpredictable and episodic 
rather than continuous (2005: 20). 
In other words, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) describe a different type of evolution in which 
major change follows huge lurches of attention and action.  There may be a longer term 
process of solution production (as described by Kingdon), but this is less likely to constrain 
action.  Rather, more radical change will be acceptable in venues that are less committed to 
existing policies (1993: 32–3).  Or, the pressure of attention (often associated with the idea of 
a ‘bandwagon effect’) will provoke policymakers to accept radically new policy images and 
solutions.  Kingdon’s picture of slow progress producing partial mutations is replaced by 
Baumgartner and Jones’ fast, disruptive, pure mutation.     
Punctuated Equilibrium and New Institutionalism 
This distinction between punctuated equilibrium and gradual, cumulative change is a key 
feature of ‘new institutionalism’.  For example, for Hall (1993: 279), policy change is 
generally incremental (first or second order) because there is a dominant set of ideas, about 
the nature of the policy problem and how it should be solved, that it is institutionalised, taken 
for granted and reproduced in the language used by policymakers.  Major, third order, change 
is rare and occurs following a perceived crisis; a profound sense of policy failure which 
appears to force governments to think about the problem and its solution in a radically new 
way.  The process is associated with profound institutional change as: (a) policymakers are 
replaced at the next election and/ or they seek advice from new experts; and, (b) radically 
new ideas are adopted and institutionalised (1993: 281).  Hall (1993) equates this process 
with Kuhn’s (1962) use of ‘paradigm shift’ to describe scientific advance – produced not by 
the gradual and linear accumulation of knowledge but, rather, the replacement of one 
scientific community by another (with profoundly different ideas) following a period of crisis 
in which new evidence suggests that its theories no longer explain how the world works 
(although, unlike Kuhn (1970: 160-3), Hall (1993: 280) does not argue that paradigm change 
should be equated with progress).   
This work on punctuated equilibrium in the new institutionalist and policy literatures has 
several elements in common. Ideas - as paradigms or sources of policy monopoly – generally 
undermine major policy change. Policymakers establish a language and set of policy 
assumptions that excludes most participants.  However, in a small number of cases when new 
ideas are adopted, they sweep aside existing monopolies (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 237) 
and cause a complete shift in the way that policy is understood and made within government 
(Hall, 1993: 287).  In both cases, the result may be major disruptive change, but Hall’s 
analysis is a more significant departure from Kingdon’s.  The process of ‘softening’ is not 
necessary because new paradigms bring new ideas.  There is no need for new solutions to be 
made consistent with existing practices; indeed, their similarity to practices in the past may 
reduce their attractiveness in this new context where the ‘old guard’ has fallen out of favour.    
Modifications to Punctuated Equilibrium 
Both approaches can be linked to recent accounts which seek to qualify (but not necessarily 
contradict) the idea of punctuated equilibrium in accounts of evolution.  For example, John’s 
(1998; 1999; 2000; 2003; 2012) ‘evolutionary theory’ notes the importance of 
implementation when describing the processes outlined by Kingdon and Baumgartner and 
Jones.  Drawing on rational choice theory, John (1998: 184) suggests that the strategies of 
actors change quickly over time as individuals learn to cooperate with each other and adapt to 
their environments (see also Axelrod, 1984).  They also learn, and their preferences change, 
when they formulate and adapt new ideas (a trial and error strategy; policy entrepreneurs try 
out combinations of ideas, ‘to find the one that replicates’ – John, 1999: 45).  This is 
‘structured evolution’ since the institutions, networks and socio-economic factors that affect 
behaviour are more static than strategies and ideas (John, 1998: 186). 
John (1998: 185) argues that evolution does not end when policies are selected at the 
formulation stage.  Policy changes further as new actors (or actors more powerful at the point 
of delivery) influence its progress; the implementation of policy is often a form of policy 
choice (Cairney, 2012a: 37-8).  This aspect is less of a challenge to Kingdon who highlights 
the analytical separation of processes or stages (such as agenda setting and policy 
formulation) and the longer term process in which actors investigate the extent to which a 
policy is technically feasible (would it work as intended if implemented?)  It is more of a 
challenge to Baumgartner and Jones and Hall, suggesting that a major disruption at the 
formulation stage does not equate to major policy change.  This argument refers not so much 
to outputs (such as the leptokurtic distribution of budget changes identified by the Policy 
Agendas Project - Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 111; True et al., 2007: 166; Jones et al, 
2009: 861), but the outcomes associated with new strategies and choices made at the local 
level.   
Such choices can be linked strongly to the role of ideas as shared beliefs which may differ at 
local and central levels.   Hall’s ‘third order’ describes profound change based on a complete 
revision of the dominant ideas underpinning policies and institutions.  However, that change 
may not necessarily translate to the ‘street’ level in areas (perhaps less like economic policy 
(Hall’s focus) and more like healthcare, social work, education and justice) where much 
delivery is devolved to people at the point of delivery.  Lipsky’s (1980) study of ‘street level 
bureaucrats’ suggests that professions and organisations have their own ideas and standard 
operating procedures.  Instructions from the top are to some extent replaced, as the source of 
explanation for policy change, by standard operating procedures, cultures and practices at the 
bottom. 
Newer accounts can also be found in new institutionalism.  For example, a growing literature 
challenges the idea that institutions are relatively fixed and only change following major 
punctuations.  Many ‘constructivist’ accounts follow Hall in describing institutions as ideas 
that influence policymaking, but then describe such institutions as unstable and open to 
constant challenge and revision (Beland and Cox, 2010; Hay, 2006; Hay and Wincott, 1998; 
Blyth, 2002: 7; Schmidt, 2006; 2010; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004).  Indeed, Hay (2002: 163) 
prefers the term ‘punctuated evolution’ to signal the importance of the ‘cumulative nature of 
often incremental change’ between punctuations. Streeck and Thelen (2005: 9) discuss the 
need to identify ‘gradual change with transformative results’ to challenge a binary distinction 
between incremental change within a stable institutional set up and a radical institutional 
change associated with punctuated equilibrium (Lindblom, 1964: 157 also challenged this 
distinction).  This agenda is supported by studies such as Palier’s (2005: 129) which 
identifies ‘gradual but profound’ third order changes (in French social policy) 
unaccompanied by crisis (see also Cairney et al, 2012: 221).  
Part of the problem is the binary distinction itself, which often seems artificial.  In other 
accounts, the discussion may appear less problematic because there is a more nuanced divide 
between gradual and abrupt change, often linked to the study of the relationship between 
power, ideas and policy learning (see Bennett and Howlett, 1992 and Cairney, 2012a: 206-7 
on various forms, and meanings, of learning – including governments adapting to their 
environments or to previous experiences through trial-and-error strategies).  For example, the 
advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible et al, 2009) 
answers Lewis and Steinmo’s (2008: 29) call for studies that recognise that ‘institutions, 
ideas and the environment change in a co-evolutionary process’: 
Policy evolution usually involves multiple, interacting cycles initiated by actors at different 
levels of government, as various formulations of problems and solutions are conceived, 
partially tested, and reformulated by a range of competing policy elites against a background 
of change in exogenous events and related policy issue areas (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 
1994: 177-8). 
‘Evolution’ is not defined or discussed extensively in ACF accounts (with the exception of 
Heintz, 1988), but the ACF conceptualises adaptation.  It describes the competition between 
coalitions of policy participants within a subsystem; coalitions include interest groups, 
government officials at multiple levels and other sources of ideas (providing 
‘enlightenment’), such as think tanks, academics and media (Sabatier, 1998: 103; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).  The glue that binds them together is ‘belief systems’ which give 
people, driven by the desire to translate their beliefs into policies, a reason to cooperate with 
each other and compete with others.  Beliefs range from ‘core’ to ‘policy core’ and secondary 
aspects.  Core beliefs are the least susceptible to change (akin to a religious conversion).  
Policy core beliefs may only change following external ‘shocks’ to the system (such as 
sudden changes in socio-economic conditions).  Secondary aspects are more subject to 
change following policy-learning.  For example, coalitions may shift their beliefs about the 
best way to deliver policy (note the ACF emphasis on selective learning; new information is 
assessed through the lens of existing, firmly held, beliefs).   
Advocacy coalitions compete for position within subsystems by learning from past policy and 
revising their strategic positions based on new evidence and the need to react to external 
events.  Change can come from within a dominant coalition, which adapts to its policy 
environment and engages in learning to protect its position (by, for example, modifying its 
position on the implementation of policy), or from a shift in power following a ‘shock’ to the 
political system which either forces the dominant coalition to question its beliefs (some 
people may leave the coalition) or is exploited by a less powerful coalition which adapts 
better to its environment (compare with Genieys and Smyrl, 2008 which focuses more on 
elites who reinterpret their interests or reconsider their motivation).  ‘Shocks’ are not 
necessarily the same as punctuations – they refer to major changes in the way that members 
of coalitions react or adapt to external events rather than the destruction of old and the 
creation of new institutions (although this area of comparison is underdeveloped in the 
literature). 
Complexity Theory 
A common solution to the search for new evolutionary approaches is the promotion of 
complexity (or complex adaptive systems) theory.  It seeks to explain why system-wide 
behaviour emerges from the interaction between ‘large collections of simpler components’ 
(Mitchell, 2009: x).  We can identify five key themes (Cairney, 2012b: 348; Cairney, 2012a: 
125-6; Mitchell, 2009: x; Geyer and Rihani, 2010: 12; Geyer, 2012; Mittleton-Kelly, 2003: 
26; Sanderson, 2006: 117; Kernick, 2006; Blackman, 2001; Lustick, 2011: 189):   
1. A complex system cannot be explained merely by breaking it down into its 
component parts because those parts are interdependent: elements interact with each 
other, share information and combine to produce systemic behaviour.
iii
   
2. The behaviour of complex systems is difficult to predict.  They exhibit ‘non-linear’ 
dynamics produced by feedback loops in which some forms of energy or action are 
dampened (negative feedback) while others are amplified (positive feedback).        
3. Complex systems are sensitive to initial conditions which produce a long-term 
momentum or ‘path dependence’.   
4. They exhibit emergence, or behaviour that evolves from the interaction between 
elements at a local level rather than central direction.  This makes the system difficult 
to control.   
5. They may contain ‘strange attractors’ or demonstrate extended regularities of 
behaviour which are ‘liable to change radically’ (Geyer and Rihani, 2010: 39; 
Bovaird, 2008: 320).  
 
The aim is to identify what types of systemic outputs occur when its members follow the 
same basic rules, and how sensitive the system is, or what small changes in rules will produce 
profound changes in systemic behaviour.  In policy studies, the literature often focuses on 
policy advice.  The main argument is that behaviour in complex systems is often 
unpredictable and generally not law-like.  Therefore, policymakers should seek to understand 
the limits to their actions and to adapt to their ‘fitness landscape’ (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 
288; Room, 2011; Blackman, 2001; Kernick, 2006; Sanderson, 2006; 2009). 
 
For Kingdon (1995: 227), complexity theory helps us explore the idea of ‘perpetual novelty’ 
and a form of evolution in which there may not be a point of equilibrium: ‘These models 
would emphasise development and adaptation, not inertia and stasis’ (see also Streeck, 2010: 
673 on ‘permanent transition’).  For Steinmo (2010) evolutionary theory is almost 
synonymous with complexity theory.  Lewis and Steinmo (2008: 8-10) argue that its focus on 
interacting elements and emergent behaviour is the key to understanding the ‘evolutionary 
puzzle’ in which ‘genes, behaviour and environment shape one another in a dynamic 
process’. In this context, complexity theory represents a way to understand institutional 
processes in three steps: institutions, as sets of rules and norms, represent the way to retain 
ideas and behaviours; complex systems represent (partly) the large number of overlapping 
and often interdependent institutions; and, new behaviours and rules arise from the 
interaction between multiple institutions and the actors involved.  This process is fluid 
because: (a) the retention of ideas in particular institutions, and therefore their influence on 
behaviour, is an imperfect process (for Streeck, 2010: 673 it is ‘stochastic’; for Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2003; 2006 it is non-existent); and, (b) ideas and rules are subject to challenge and 
revision when actors interact with others who follow different rules (in ways that are difficult 
to predict).  
 
Complexity Theory: Cumulative Knowledge or Theoretical Punctuation? 
Advocates of complexity theory suggest that it represents a paradigm shift from the science 
of the past. Further, this revolutionary break from the ‘reductionist’ approach, associated with 
‘Newtonian’ physics, is necessary to understand systems that lack the order and stability 
required to produce universal rules about behaviour and outcomes (Mitchell, 2009: x; Geyer 
and Rihani, 2010: 5-6; 29; Room, 2011: 15).  As Keating (2009: 301) suggests, this tendency 
towards providing new concepts is widespread in political science, producing a lack of clarity 
regarding their link to old concepts and the extent to which we are describing new 
phenomena as well as new ideas. The more interesting and productive discussion may regard 
how complexity theory relates to, and builds on, existing theories – an important task for 
evolutionary theory which considers how the past relates to the present and if we can provide 
concepts that help explain both.  Cairney (2012b: 350-1; 2012a: 126-8) highlights two 
literatures (historical institutionalism and punctuated equilibrium theory) which we can relate 
directly to complexity theory and one (implementation) which shares many of its insights.
iv
 
‘Path dependence’ and ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ are key themes in historical 
institutionalism.   Path dependence suggests that when a commitment to a policy has been 
established and resources devoted to it, over time it produces ‘increasing returns’ when 
people adapt to, and build on, the initial decision (Pierson, 2000; Room, 2011: 7-8; 16-8).  In 
many cases these ‘returns’ are associated with the maintenance of institutions.  Historical 
studies often define institutions as ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard 
operating procedures that structure conflict’ (Hall in Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2).   The 
focus of analysis involves a ‘critical juncture’ and the timing of decisions is crucial, because 
it may be the order of events that sets policy on a particular path.  We identify inertia and 
unpredictability, as relatively small events or actions can have a huge and enduring effect on 
policy.  Pierson (2000: 253) and Room (2011: 16) adopt the same language (the ‘Polya urn’) 
and examples (such as the QWERTY keyboard) to describe the unpredictability of events and 
initial choices followed by inflexibility when the rules governing systemic behaviour become 
established and difficult to change.  Therefore, complexity theory is not necessarily a 
departure from historical institutionalism.  It draws on similar concepts to examine a different 
object of study; from a single institution to a complex system consisting of multiple 
interacting institutions (although we need to be careful about the parallels and should not 
assume a common meaning to shared terms – see Cairney, 2013).   
 
Punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; compare with Bovaird, 2008: 
321 and Klijn 2008: 302) often employs the language of complexity to explain policy change.   
The ‘general punctuation hypothesis’ demonstrates, in a study of information processing, that 
policy processes exhibit non-linear dynamics.    Jones and Baumgartner (2005: 7) define 
information processing as the ‘collecting, assembling, interpreting and prioritizing [of] 
signals from the environment’.  Policymakers are effectively surrounded by an infinite 
number of ‘signals’, or information that could be relevant to their decisions.  Since they are 
boundedly rational and do not have the ability to process all signals, they must simplify their 
decision-making environment by ignoring most (negative feedback) and promoting few to the 
top of their agenda (positive feedback).  In other words, this literature allows us to make 
sense of complexity theory, demonstrating how abstract terms can be operationalised in 
public policy research.  
 
Complexity theory’s focus on emergent behaviour in the absence of central control also 
evokes the literatures on implementation and governance.   Both examine the problems that 
central governments face when they do not recognise the extent to which policy changes as it 
is implemented (Cairney, 2009; Butler and Allen, 2008; Klijn, 2008).  The level of 
interdependence governments share with implementing organisations has prompted the 
identification of ‘self-organizing networks’ (Rhodes, 1997: 50) and images of ‘bottom-up’ 
implementation through self-selecting clusters of organizations in which a variety of public 
and private organizations cooperate (Barret and Fudge, 1981; Hjern and Porter, 1981).  While 
there is scope for central governments to control implementation, most notably through cross-
cutting targets linked to the control of public expenditure (Richards and Smith, 2004), 
Lipsky’s (1980) analysis of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ suggests that, since public sector 
professions are subject to an immense range of (often unclear) requirements laid down by 
regulations at the top, they are powerless to implement them all successfully.    Instead, they 
establish routines and use rules of thumb to satisfy a proportion of central government 
objectives while preserving a sense of professional autonomy necessary to maintain morale.   
 
These issues of implementation are central to complexity theory.  For example, Geyer and 
Rihani (2010: 23; see also Geyer, 2012; Little, 2012) suggest that policymakers in the UK 
have been too driven by the idea of ‘order’ - by maintaining rigid government hierarchies, 
producing top-down, centrally driven policy strategies, and adopting new public management 
reforms which ‘required a radical increase in performance indicators so that the centre could 
oversee and direct what the local and decentralised actors were doing’.   Yet, policymaking 
defies such simple solutions.  Complex systems have ‘self-organizing capacities’, making 
them difficult to control; the effect of an internal or external force may be large or small and 
this is impossible to predict from the force alone (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 288).  Since 
complex policymaking systems are not amenable to such control, the outcome may be policy 
failure and demoralised policymakers (Room, 2011: 7).  Complexity theorists often provide 
an alternative approach: to use pilot projects and employ ‘trial and error’ strategies which are 
open to constant adaptation (Sanderson 2009: 707; 2006: 118; Haynes, 2008: 326; compare 
with Lindblom, 1959: 86 on incrementalism).  This often involves giving implementing 
officials more discretion to adapt policy in response to this dynamic process (Bovaird, 2008: 
339).  The ‘fitness landscape’ (the ‘surroundings in which living beings exist and behave’) is 
unstable and often changes rapidly and the policy process is ‘guided by a variety of forces’, 
suggesting that X will only have an effect on Y under particular conditions that are difficult 
to specify.  Therefore, agents or organisations must be able to adapt quickly and not rely on a 
single policy strategy directed by the centre (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 289; see also 
Mitleton-Kelly, 2003: 35-6).  
 
From Metaphor to Reality? What are Evolutionary Theory’s Causal Mechanisms? 
In some cases, ‘evolution’ is used loosely to describe change or as a metaphor to describe 
familiar themes in the policy literature.  It may have no direct explanatory value.  In (rather 
few) others, there is an attempt to use evolution in a more direct way.  For example, Dowding 
(2000: 74) discusses the potential for evolutionary theory to predict the success of particular 
behaviours in response to particular environments, but primarily to reject John’s (1999) use 
of evolutionary theory to explain short term events.  Dowding (2000: 79) favours a focus on 
institutions (as rules that advantage some and disadvantage others), noting that the timescale 
required to analyse evolution is ‘decades or centuries’.     
 
Lewis and Steinmo (2008: 15-6) focus on ‘universal’ evolutionary mechanisms - variation, 
selection and retention – to combine two related propositions: ‘all living things – including 
humans - want to pass on their genes’ and they ‘inherit powerful instincts to follow social 
rules’ (this trait is often linked in ‘evolutionary psychology’ to the need for our ‘hunter-
gatherer ancestors’ to cooperate to secure scarce food and find fair ways to distribute it – 
Smith and Larimer, 2009: 217).  In other words, they are driven by self interest and a desire 
to cooperate (by following common rules), to ensure their own survival and that of their ‘kin, 
family, or clan’.   ‘Variation’ refers to the different rules adopted by different social groups to 
foster the collective action required to survive.  ‘Selection’ describes the interaction between 
people and their environments; particular environments may provide an advantage to some 
groups over others and encourage certain behaviours (or, at least, some groups may respond 
by adapting their behaviour to their environment).  ‘Retention’ describes the ways in which 
people pass on their genes (memes) to ensure the reproduction of their established rules (see 
also Lustick, 2011: 190 on variation, competition and retention).  For Lewis and Steinmo 
(2008: 20), this process is often inefficient, producing examples of imperfect ways to pass 
down memes and instances in which institutions fail to adapt to new environments (compare 
with the trait in many humans to eat high fat diets and not adapt well enough to the now-
plentiful supply of food – Lustick, 2011: 199).  In other words, ‘evolution’ does not describe 
social or political progress.  Rather, new forms of behaviour are constantly developing as 
groups adapt to their environments and respond to the actions of other groups who create and 
maintain different institutions.   
 
In this light, complexity theory becomes a way to examine the often unpredictable outcomes 
of this interaction.  We examine the outcomes of interaction between interdependent actors 
who share information.  We explore the importance of past behaviours which created 
institutions with a long-term effect on behaviour, as well as new behaviour that emerges from 
interaction.  We identify the ways in which groups adapt their behaviour and institutions in 
response to their environments (in some cases by changing their environments).  The 
expectation is that ‘gradual evolutionary change is the norm’ because actors and institutions 
are constantly adapting and interacting; people may follow rules for long periods, only to 
change their behaviour (perhaps, in some instances, dramatically) when they reinterpret rules 
following their interaction with others and their adaptation to changing circumstances (Lewis 
and Steinmo, 2008: 24).   
 
These uses of ‘evolution’ as metaphors or to describe real processes are not too far apart, and 
we are not at the stage where we can reject one approach in favour of another.  Rather, both 
approaches describe familiar processes of rule-influenced actions, actors adapting to their 
environments, and actors seeking to change the rules and their environments – in other words, 
the concept of ‘dual causation’ when ‘agents interact and co-evolve with their environment’ 
(Lewis and Steinmo, 2010: 238; see also Lustick, 2011: 201 on the familiar study of path 
dependence mixed with ‘leadership, policy choices, and new ideas’).   
 
Both approaches are also generally unclear on the magnitude of change and the time it takes 
to occur – a common problem that limits our understanding of causation.  This uncertainty is 
a feature of most policy analysis (Cairney, 2012a: 26-30).  The specific problem is that 
‘evolutionary change’ may conjure up an image of a process that can take hundreds or 
thousands of years to complete – yet few accounts have this in mind.  Instead, gradual and 
punctuated accounts present similar ideas about the relationship between major change and 
time.  For example, in punctuated equilibrium accounts we can identify a range of rapid 
processes, from annual budget punctuations (True et al, 2007: 170; Jones et al, 2009: 861) to 
the ten-plus years it took to break down and replace the UK’s economic paradigm (Hall, 1993 
and in correspondence) and the decades it took to produce a complete shift in government 
policy on issues such as tobacco (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009: 269; Cairney et al, 2012: 
221-7).  Kingdon’s (1984: 122-36) timeframe for the more gradual evolution of ideas is 
similar, from ‘a while’ to ‘a few years’ to ‘twenty-five-years’.  It is also not clear if modern 
institutionalist accounts of ‘gradual but profound’ third order changes really contrast with 
Hall’s image of punctuated equilibrium, since the latter draws on Kuhn (1970: 150) who 
often identifies gradual paradigm change as one generation of scientists grows and another 
dies.   
 
A partial solution to this disconnect between the intuitive notion of evolutionary change in 
nature, and more rapid change in policymaking, is to recognise that we are talking about 
change that takes place over multiple generations.  Further, we should depart from the 
intuitive notion of evolution as a means to describe the shift from homo sapiens or hominids 
to humans (anything from 100,000 to six million years).  For example, the paradigm shift 
described by Kuhn (1970: 150-1) may be complete in the space of a single generation, when 
a new breed of scientists replaces the old – a process that may be quicker in politics when 
new generations of politicians and expert replace the old (Hall, 1993: 280).  A more current 
and relevant analogy, since it retains the idea of change over multiple generations and it 
maintains our focus on the importance of memes (which are sometimes ascribed virus-like 
properties – Richardson, 2000), might be the evolution of fruit flies (months) or bacteria 
(days or weeks).  These analogies may be more useful to describe the highly fluid trial-and-
error strategies of actors. Complexity theory also portrays institutions as relatively fluid sets 
of rules which change as they interact with other institutions and are challenged by actors.  
The new analogies will never make our analysis crystal clear, but they at least address the 
need to distinguish between evolution over one year and one hundred years. 
 
From Theory to Method  
Evolutionary accounts draw our attention to specific policy processes but often remain rather 
vague.  They may take us beyond metaphor but also describe a complex system that defies 
simple explanation.  They identify multiple institutions, sources of rules and a variety of 
behaviours, but not the way to select the most relevant or important.  In other words, this is a 
developing field of study that appears to be wide open for anyone to use.  In this light, it 
seems unfortunate that evolution is often linked to a particular way to understand the world.  
We can identify three main attempts to reject certain approaches.  First, Lewis and Steinmo 
(2008: 15-20; 2010: 237) argue that rational choice theory, which assumes fixed preferences 
and equilibrium points, is unable to capture the real world characterised by more nuanced 
behaviour and disequilibrium.  Such criticism often seems to be based on a caricature of early 
post-war rational choice (Dowding, in correspondence).  As the work of John (2012; and 
Axelrod, 1984) suggests, modern accounts can be adapted to apply to evolutionary studies 
(see also Smith and Larimer, 2009: 217 on evolutionary psychology and ‘wary cooperators’).  
Second, Steinmo (2010: 13) describes fundamental differences in the natural and social 
worlds, and recommends that our research projects follow suit.  Yet, complexity theory is 
often described as a new way for natural and social scientists to collaborate (Mitchell, 2009). 
Third, complexity theory is often accompanied by a rejection of past scientific practices.  The 
main object of criticism, in both the natural and social sciences, is the ‘Newtonian’ approach 
to science in which we can reduce a complex world into its essential elements and monitor 
their independent effects.  ‘Positivist’ quantitative methods or ‘sophisticated comparative 
statics’ are ‘out of sync with the way the world actually works’ (Steinmo, 2010: 7-9; 12; 
Lewis and Steinmo, 2010: 236).  ‘Quantitative and reductionist methodologies’ may be useful 
to explain topics such as elections with ‘rules and orderly structures’, but not issues which 
contain unpredictable political events, significant levels of uncertainty and ambiguity (Geyer 
and Rihani, 2010: 74-5) or factors outside of the control of policymakers (Room, 2011: 6-7; 
Klijn, 2008: 314).  Lewis and Steinmo (2010: 239) argue that, in the absence of a world that 
obeys universal laws, science should not be built on the idea that we can make reliable 
predictions of the future.  Rather, we look to the past, using historical narratives to explain it 
(a point expanded by Pollitt, 2008).  Yet, few modern scientists would subscribe slavishly to 
a naive version of reductionism and prediction (Curry 2003: 114).  Instead, they highlight the 
need to reduce the world into something more analytically manageable.  The world is too 
complicated to study unless we simplify it.   
The benefit of complexity theory is that it offers the chance for a wide range of sciences to 
produce comparable research programmes, and for a range of approaches to come together 
under one banner within a single discipline.  For example, in policy studies we can usefully 
see interpretive work, to help understand how actors adapt to their environments, working 
alongside quantitative methods and mathematically generated computer modelling, to help 
understand ‘systemic behaviour’ or the outcomes when large numbers of actors and 
institutions interact (Cairney, 2010).   Much depends on our interpretation of complexity.  For 
example, first, Teisman and Klijn (2008: 289) describe the potential for actors within 
complex systems to create ‘their own perception of what they want and how to behave in the 
landscape they are in’.  This suggests that it would be valuable to observe and interview 
policymakers to examine how they make sense of environments; to identify which heuristics 
(e.g. how they gather information) or rules of thumb (e.g. who they trust and/or consult most) 
they use to respond to their environment, and to examine the extent to which such practices 
are based on rules passed down through generations (for example, when UK Governments 
are associated with ‘departmental views’).   
Second, Mitleton-Kelly (2003: 41) places more emphasis on self-organisation and emergent 
behaviour as it relates to the whole system.  We are not just talking about individuals 
adapting to their environments because ‘a system may need to be studied as a complete and 
interacting whole rather than as an assembly of distinct and separate elements’.  This 
suggests that it would be valuable to mathematically model a complex political system to 
explore, with computation, the interaction between actors; to identify shifts of behaviour 
prompted by, for example, the evolution of strategies after ‘generations’ of interaction (and 
much of the information required to make realistic models may come from initial qualitative 
research).  Third, complex systems often exhibit ‘strange attractors’ or demonstrate extended 
regularities of behaviour.  This suggests that quantitative methods exploring relationships 
between X and Y may still be valuable, even if the relationship only holds in certain 
circumstances.  Indeed, they might usefully be supplemented by ‘experimental’ methods 
(informed by the literature on psychological experiments) that enable us to modify the 
environments of actors and identify how they act and interact in different circumstances.  
Finally, the development of ‘evolutionary psychology’ (Smith and Larimer, 2009: 217-21), as 
an explanation for why people follow rules and norms, seems to dovetail with modern 
accounts of institutional rational choice which use multiple methods and collaborate regularly 
with scholars in multiple disciplines (see Poteete et al, 2010; Cairney, 2013).  It may be more 
useful to give some credit to quantitative researchers and rational choice theorists, and invite 
them to consider issues of complexity, than to reject their understanding of the world and 
their methods out of hand – since the latter limits our field and our ability to share insights.   
Conclusion 
There is considerable variation in the use of ‘evolution’ to describe policymaking.  Kingdon 
describes the cumulative, long term development of policy solutions.  Baumgartner and Jones 
describe long periods of political stability and policy continuity interrupted by major changes 
in the way that policymakers frame policy problems.  Hall describes a process in which 
policymaking institutions, as paradigms, are maintained for long periods but, in rare cases, 
replaced completely following periods of crisis.  John describes a process of trial-and-error 
adaptation of policy strategies at multiple stages.  The advocacy coalition framework presents 
an image of policymaking based on the beliefs of participants and the interactions within and 
across coalitions.  These approaches have a lot in common.  For example, almost no accounts 
suggest that evolutionary change equates to advance in the ‘social Darwinian’ sense.  There 
are clear differences in the way we understand the likelihood and extent of instability and 
major policy change, but also a common desire to move beyond explanations of change that 
rely on a major external effect - to consider the importance of change from within.    
However, ‘evolution’ is still generally used as a metaphor to describe quite different things, 
such as: periods of stability/ continuity and instability/ change; and, the opposite of and 
parallel to revolution.  Further, no account of evolution helps us measure the size of policy 
change or identify the most appropriate time-frame.  Rather, evolutionary theory allows us to 
articulate, in a new way, the longstanding compromises regarding structure and agency, 
endogenous and exogenous change, and behaviour based on self-interest and norms. 
Complexity theory has emerged as one possible way to advance our study of evolution.  It 
has significant and increasing support in the literature and builds on the insights associated 
with historical institutionalism, punctuated equilibrium theory, implementation and 
governance studies.  For some, it may provide the potential to develop a general theory of 
policy systems that Smith and Larimer (2009: 15-17) argue has eluded policy scholars. Yet, it 
is not a panacea or a direct replacement to the more established literature.  Indeed, the work 
has only just begun to establish if complexity, as a general theory across the sciences as a 
whole, has a meaningful contribution to make to our current knowledge (or if it can challenge 
the way that we currently understand public policy).  In the meantime, the field is still wide 
open.  In this light, it would be inappropriate to decide that, since complexity allegedly 
invokes a particular ontology, we should necessarily adopt a particular approach to 
epistemology and methodology and reject other accounts with different ideas and methods.  
There is often a tendency to use the worst offenders in each approach to reject an approach 
altogether, rather than seeking points of agreement on which we can work.  Few researchers 
adhere slavishly to one understanding of the world over another.  Evolutionary theory should 
therefore not be used simply as another way to reject some approaches and limit the field.   
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i
 The original description of multiple streams was Cohen et al’s (1972) garbage can model, based on a study of 
University decision making.  Kingdon’s analysis has also been extended to other political systems such as the 
UK and France (Cairney, 2012: 239-42; 2009; Cairney et al, 2012; Zahariadis, 2003; 2007). 
ii
 Used by paleobiologists Eldredge and Gould (1972) to ‘describe gaps in the evolutionary record’ 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 19; see also Hay, 2002: 160) 
iii
 See Lewis and Steinmo (2010: 239) ‘Just as genes at the micro-level interact to form a unique individual, 
individuals within a population interact to replicate institutions. The character of the whole institution is thus 
distinct from a simple aggregation of the constituent units’. 
iv
 Note that few accounts link complexity to older systems theories associated with Easton and others (see 
Cairney, 2012: 113; 128-9).   
